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Abstract  
This article assesses the development and implementation of the Community Remedy 
anti-social behaviour (ASB) policy by Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in 
England and Wales. The Community Remedy, introduced by the Anti-Social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act (2014), allows victims of 'low-level' ASB to select an informal 
action for their offender from a list designed by their local PCC via consultation with 
the public. This article reports the results of a benchmarking exercise that investigates 
how PCCs have translated this policy into practice by examining: public consultation 
procedures, the contents of the Community Remedy documents and police usage. The 
findings indicate an uneven implementation across regions with variable levels of 
engagement from PCCs, police forces and members of the public. We assess the 
enactment and adoption of this new power alongside its potential to stimulate 
democratic localism.  
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Introduction 
The Community Remedy was introduced in England and Wales by the Anti-Social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014) as part of wholesale changes to anti-social 
behaviour (ASB) policy that sought to 'put victims first' (Home Office, 2012a). This new 
legislation marked a seminal moment in ASB policy because previous powers primarily 
focused on the activities of perpetrators. During the development of the new 
legislation, the Home Office (2012b) found that some police forces were using 
community resolutions and conditional cautions to address minor cases of ASB as an 
alternative to the formal criminal justice system, but they were not used consistently 
across forces. Thus, the Community Remedy was created to provide a transparent 
framework for both the public and victims to be involved in the justice process. The 
premise of the Community Remedy is that victims of crime and ASB are able to have a 
say in the punishment of their offender, by selecting a penalty from a predetermined 
'document' of informal ‘actions’. Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and their 
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associated police forces were given the responsibility to create a bespoke, locally-
relevant Community Remedy document1 and enforce it within their area. The Remedy 
can be used when a community resolution2, conditional caution or youth conditional 
caution3 has been selected as the chosen disposal, with police officers responsible for 
ensuring the chosen action is appropriate and proportionate to the offence. Both the 
victim and offender must agree to the Community Remedy as a course of action, with 
the offender having to admit their guilt for the offence (Home Office, 2014). 
Formulating the Community Remedy policy so it is delivered by the police alone marks 
a departure from the commitment to tackling ASB using a multi-agency approach 
(Cooper et al., 2009). Creating a police-led power does not reflect the wide range of 
agencies who are involved in tackling ASB, which often includes the local authority, 
registered providers of social housing and youth offending teams.  
                                            
1
 'Menu' and 'sanctions' were the original terms used in the draft of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime 
and Policing Bill (2012) and in the Home Office (2013) consultation report. However, these terms were 
replaced by 'document' and 'actions' in the Act itself (2014). Some police forces still use the original 
terminology; however the most recent terms will be used in this article. 
2
 In England and Wales, a community resolution is a nationally recognised term that is used when an 
incident or crime is diverted outside of the formal criminal justice system. A community resolution can 
be used with both youth and adult offenders to administer a non-statutory, and often restorative, 
disposal. The views of victims are taken into account when reaching agreement about the disposal and 
offenders must take responsibility for commission of the act. 
3
 A conditional caution also diverts an incident or crime outside of the formal criminal justice system 
when an offender both admits to commission of the offence and accepts conditions imposed by a police 
officer. The conditional caution was initially introduced in the Criminal Justice Act (2003) and was 
updated in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (2012) which also established 
youth conditional cautions.   
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The research outlined in this paper is the first to examine the operationalisation of the 
Community Remedy powers by PCCs and the police, and provides a significant initial 
insight into whether the Home Office’s promise to ‘put victims first’ has been 
translated effectively into practice. This is important because figures from the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales show ASB to be a widespread problem, with 1.66 million 
incidents recorded by police in 2017-18 (Office for National Statistics, 2018a). This is 
supported by data that highlights the proportion of people who perceive high levels of 
ASB in their area, which currently stands at 10% (Office for National Statistics, 2018b). 
The implementation of the Community Remedy offers an opportunity for this paper to 
explore the extent to which PCC’s are seizing the initiative (or not) in this area and to 
provide some preliminary analysis of local variations in policy implementation. The aim 
of the paper is to present the findings of a benchmarking exercise, which ascertains 
how the Community Remedy has been established and implemented by PCCs4 and 
police forces at a local level. The research objectives were to: shed light on the scope 
and detail of the community consultations undertaken by PCCs, examine the 
availability and contents of the Community Remedy documents to the public, and 
assess police usage of the new power. The authors provide an analytical framework 
                                            
4
 When referring to PCCs we include Greater Manchester and London, where PCC responsibilities rest 
with the Mayor. 
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through which the implementation of victim-oriented strategies can be understood in 
local contexts. As a consequence of this, the paper informs debates about the realities 
of democratic localism when delivered through PCCs and provides some initial 
feedback on the utility of the Community Remedy as a victim-focused ASB policy.  
 
ASB, Victims and Restorative Policing 
The policy repositioning of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition and 
subsequent Conservative governments has raised ASB victims’ expectations of 
achieving justice, particularly through the two core victim-focused powers, the 
Community Remedy and the Community Trigger5, which set out to improve victim 
satisfaction with the criminal justice process (Duggan and Heap, 2014). The Home 
Office conducted a consultation exercise in 2013 to seek views from both ASB-related 
organisations and the general public about their plans to implement the Community 
Remedy. In general, the public supported victims being involved in the punishment of 
their offenders (Home Office, 2013). The Association of Chief Police Officers (now 
known as the National Police Chiefs Council) and police forces were in favour, but 
cautioned against increased bureaucracy and threats to police discretion. PCCs 
                                            
5
 The Community Trigger was also introduced by the ASB, Crime and Policing Act (2014). It forces the 
authorities to review their responses to complaints of ASB in circumstances where the victim feels no 
action has been taken, if a particular local reporting threshold has been met. See Heap (2016) for a 
critical discussion. 
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provided mixed responses, with the major concern being inconsistencies in practice. 
The most critical response was from the Magistrates' Association who felt that 
responses to ASB should be dealt with by the courts because a lack of judicial oversight 
and the informality of out of court sanctions would lead to more offending (Home 
Office, 2013). This viewpoint is challenged by a growing body of evidence which 
indicates that the use of informal community-based practices can lead to lower rates 
of re-offending, reduced costs and improved victim satisfaction (Bazemore, 2000; 
Shapland et al., 2008; Clamp and Paterson, 2016). This latter perspective seems to 
have been supported by Home Office guidance which offered much flexibility for local 
implementers.  
 
Home Office (2014, 2017) guidance notes that each component of the Community 
Remedy must be appropriate and proportionate to the behaviour/offences for which 
community resolutions are employed and thus offers implementers the flexibility to 
translate the enhanced victim-orientation of the Community Remedy into practice. 
The Community Remedy actions are grouped into three categories, with each action 
requiring a: 
 
·         punitive element: reflecting the effects on the victim and wider community; or 
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·         reparative element: achieving appropriate restitution/reparation to the victim; or 
·         rehabilitative elements: helping to address the causes of the perpetrator's 
behaviour; or 
·         combination of these. 
(Home Office, 2014: 13) 
 
Operationally, this translates into a range of actions such as: making an apology to the 
victim, taking part in a restorative justice activity, paying for any damage caused, or 
participating in structured activities (Home Office, 2014). In terms of the 
implementation process, PCCs were presented with a non-legally binding duty to 
consult the public as well as a statutory duty to consult their local authority and chief 
constable about the contents of the document. The Home Office Impact Assessment 
(2012b: 1) states that a public consultation about the Community Remedy would help 
PCCs ‘make the approach to low-level crime and anti-social behaviour in their area 
more responsive and accountable to victims and the public’. However, paradoxically, 
the Ministry of Justice funding for PCCs to locally commission services for victims of 
crime does not apply to victims of ASB (Ministry of Justice, 2013a). Nevertheless, giving 
PCCs responsibility for the Community Remedy reflects one of their core remits; to 
involve the public more in the decision making process through localised, transparent 
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and more accountable decision making (Cabinet Office, 2015). The introduction of 
PCCs has not been without criticism from scholars, including Reiner (2013:174), who 
suggests 'the new system of police governance, with PCCs as the lynchpin, moves 
policing further away from democratic governance, disguised by a fig-leaf of populism'. 
We revisit this proposition throughout the paper by using the Community Remedy as a 
vehicle for assessing the role of PCCs as enablers of democratic localism. 
 
The Community Remedy has the potential to meet victims’ needs because it adds an 
element of restorative justice to the ASB agenda which had been largely missing from 
existing tools and powers. The contribution of restorative approaches to the justice 
process and, in particular, to reductions in reoffending has been increasingly 
recognised (Shapland et al., 2008; Sherman and Strang, 2012) yet questions remain 
about whether restorative principles will transfer effectively to ASB in a manner that 
empowers victims. Braithwaite (1989) explains how restorative justice should be 
understood as a holistic approach to individual and collective harms, yet the most 
widely used definition of restorative justice in the UK is Marshall's (1999:5) narrower 
description of 'a process whereby parties with a stake in a specific offence collectively 
resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the 
future'. In practical terms, this latter definition seeks to capture activities which re-
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engage individuals and communities yet remain components of traditional justice 
processes.  
 
Police use of restorative justice in England and Wales emerged during the late 1990s 
although this initial experimentation stagnated and many of the pilot programmes 
disappeared (Paterson and Clamp, 2012). Since 2013, the Home Office and Ministry of 
Justice have encouraged the police to undertake further innovations with restorative 
and other community-based resolutions via additional funding (Ministry of Justice, 
2013b), new legislation (for example, the Crime and Courts Act (2013)), a nationwide 
action plan (Ministry of Justice, 2014) and the promise of enhanced officer discretion 
to deliver more victim-focused policing.  
 
Successful police-led restorative programmes have often been driven by community 
demands for justice and security, with prominent victim voices that have been 
captured and co-ordinated alongside engaged local agencies (Moore and Forsythe 
1995; Bazemore 2000; Paterson and Clamp 2012). This means that the extent of 
consultation and community engagement during the policy implementation process is 
likely to be indicative of the relative success or failure of the Community Remedy. It 
also means that local variance should be expected. While questions have been raised 
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about fairness and equity when local variance in the implementation of criminal or 
community justice sanctions emerges (Crawford and Clear, 2001), it is also possible to 
view differences in practice as evidence of the strengthening of democratic localism.  
 
The Community Remedy process seeks to mobilise the democratic potential of civic 
enterprises and ‘informal modes of organising space, livelihood and citizenship’ (Roy, 
2010). Using 'informality' as a response to urban problems has been most evident in 
the Global South where state services and resources are limited, although it is evident 
that similar shifts in governance can emerge in developed states experiencing 
neoliberal roll-back (Featherstone et al., 2012). Citizen distrust in formal local and 
national administrations can be counteracted by bottom-up initiatives that operate in 
a democratic and inclusive manner that incorporates the concerns of the victimised 
and marginalised. Victim-oriented approaches challenge the offender-oriented 
assumptions and priorities of state officials and their tendency to focus upon victims’ 
administrative needs to the detriment of mechanisms for building resilience and 
community capital (Walklate, 2011; Duggan and Heap, 2014). The emphasis placed 
upon the agency of individuals and inter-personal relationships avoids 
disempowerment and situates the individual as an active social agent in the justice 
process. It is at this point that the aspirations of victim-oriented ASB and victim-
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mobilising restorative approaches connect and are embedded in policy structures 
through the democratic localism of PCCs. Yet, despite the theoretical promise of 
victim-oriented programmes there remain a number of challenges to policy 
development and implementation – most notably, the tendency of governance 
structures to co-opt innovation for its own purposes.  
 
Previous analyses of restorative policing initiatives in the United Kingdom have 
identified varying degrees of dilution of restorative values and principles during the 
implementation process of new programmes (Paterson and Clamp, 2016). The term 
‘restorative policing’ recognises the central role played by the police in restorative 
practices that focus on an underpinning philosophy of diversion and informal 
approaches to social control which create the space for informal actors and agencies to 
focus upon building community capital (Sampson et al., 1997; Clamp and Paterson 
2016). This focus upon the underlying causes of crime and insecurity should help to 
address some of the criticisms previously made about ASB, particularly its emphasis on 
stand-alone enforcement measures (Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011). The Community 
Remedy has the potential to embed restorative policing practices in cases of ASB, 
although potential conflicts remain with the competing punitive and rehabilitative 
elements of the Community Remedy.  
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Both restorative policing and ASB discourse seek to promote informal modes of 
citizenship and organisation while simultaneously responding to the legitimacy and 
resourcing challenges faced in neoliberal criminal justice contexts. Viewed from this 
perspective, and the drive for a locally situated victim-oriented policy, it is possible to 
align the reparative elements of the Community Remedy with the more punitive and 
enforcement-led aims of traditional ASB sanctions. The devolution of democratic 
responsibility to local decision-making structures provides opportunities for both 
radical interpretations of new policy initiatives as well as the continuation of 
traditional offender-oriented criminal justice. Where community ownership and 
criminal justice buy-in is achieved, there are opportunities to achieve long-term 
sustainable change (McCold and Wachtel, 1996). 
 
The shift towards democratic localism in England and Wales is exemplified by the 
increasingly influential role of PCCs in delivering an enhanced victim-focus in 
partnership with their communities (Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, 
2019). Diversity in the extent of consultation, implementation, governance and use of 
the Community Remedy is expected from police forces and shines a light on local 
policing philosophies and the networks of influence and power that direct policy and 
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practice at the local level.  Analysis of the implementation of the Community Remedy 
thus offers an opportunity to interrogate the dynamics that influence policy 
articulation, development and implementation at the local level. 
 
Methodology 
To assess the range of research objectives, a cross-sectional research design was 
employed to examine and benchmark a range of factors relating to the local 
implementation of the Community Remedy. The actions undertaken by all 43 PCCs and 
police forces in England and Wales were considered and the majority of data collected 
between July and October 2016, with supplementary data gathered in July 2017 and 
July 2018. 
 
Content analyses of both PCC and police force websites were undertaken to examine 
local public consultation and the accessibility of the published Community Remedy 
document. This analysis was initially conducted in autumn 2016 and, due to significant 
gaps in available information, further analysis and data collection was undertaken in 
July 2017 and July 2018. Using websites as an object of content analysis is potentially 
problematic because of their dynamic nature, and is contingent on the skills of the 
researcher collecting the data. Once every available Community Remedy document 
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had been located we conducted a further content analysis to determine the types of 
actions included in each document. In addition, the actions were compared to the 
examples provided on the Home Office (2014) guidance, to assess how locally 
responsive PCCs had been when compiling their bespoke document. 
 
The website and documentary analyses were supplemented by Freedom of 
Information (FOI) requests to police forces to quantify Community Remedy usage. 
Under the Freedom of Information Act (2000) individuals and organisations can make 
requests for data held by public authorities, including the police. FOIs should be made 
in writing and the authorities must respond within twenty working-days, with either 
the requested information in full or a refusal to provide the information based on 
twenty-three exemptions detailed in the Act (see Bows (2017) for further details). 
Submitting FOI requests enabled us to access information from police forces that was 
not readily available in the public domain, which democratises the research process 
and allowed us to access a large amount of data within a small research project 
(Savage and Hyde, 2014). The findings from each data collection component built up a 
useful picture of how PCCs and police forces have adopted these nationally prescribed 
powers at a local level. They also demonstrate how each local force is catering for the 
needs of ASB victims (or not). 
15 
 
 
Findings 
The findings from this study will be reported in three sections, namely: the public 
consultation, availability and contents of the Community Remedy documents, and 
usage. 
 
Public Consultation 
To determine the extent of the public consultations undertaken by PCCs, a search of 
their websites was conducted (see Table 1). Of the 43 PCC websites, 18 initially lacked 
any evidence of a consultation process during the first stage of data collection and 
analysis in Autumn 2016 despite this being an official (although non-legally binding) 
requirement (the statutory duty only applies to consulting with the local authority and 
local chief police officer). 8 PCCs had immediately published detailed information 
about their public consultations, providing details of the results, supplemented by 
tables and graphs. The remaining 17 PCCs simply stated that a ‘public consultation’ or 
discussion with ‘community representatives’ had been undertaken. There were no 
updates to the available data during the review conducted in July 2017 but when this 
data was reviewed again in July 2018 10 of the 18 websites had been updated.  
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It was clear, in many instances, that delays to publication had been influenced by other 
policy developments as the Community Remedy was integrated into wider reviews of 
ASB, restorative justice and the use of out-of-court disposals. Thus, there is evidence of 
divergence during the implementation process as regional policy entrepreneurs 
integrate the community remedy into ASB, restorative justice and other policy 
agendas. Table 1 provides an illustration of the data.    
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE] 
 
Where details of a public consultation were provided, the preferred mode for collating 
responses was via a survey function on the PCC website, which was usually available 
for four weeks. Nevertheless, significant discrepancies were found between PCCs in 
relation to the numbers of responses obtained and the efforts put into generating 
public engagement. For example, one force obtained 3,500 responses (highest) 
compared to another that received only 100 (lowest). Some PCCs went to great lengths 
to generate a large sample size, such as emailing contacts (one PCC emailed 2400 
agencies/groups on the PCC’s mailing list) and others circulated press releases. Others 
fared poorly in comparison, with one website still containing a link to an out of date 
survey (by a number of months) and no further evidence of the outcome of the 
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consultation. While some regions were late implementers of the Community Remedy, 
it was also clear in the final stages of the data collection that many PCCs had improved 
the transparency of their consultation processes via dedicated webpages. Despite this, 
the method of presenting consultation data and reports remained divergent across the 
43 regions.  
 
These findings recall the 'postcode lottery' critique of other locally governed 
community justice initiatives (Heap, 2016). The data also demonstrates that on 
average, where sample sizes were reported, that consultations numbers were in the 
low hundreds. From a researcher’s perspective this reflects poor external validity, even 
before the self-selecting nature of the participants is considered. Conducting a web 
survey also limits participation to those with internet access, and with the capacity to 
use/engage with this medium; who might not necessarily be the ones who are most at 
risk of suffering ASB victimisation. 
 
Availability and Contents of the Community Remedy Documents 
According to the Home Office guidance (2014: 11), 'the Community Remedy document 
must be published'. The guidance does not specify where it should be published, but 
given the prominence of the internet as a means of communication (Office for National 
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Statistics, 2017) and the fact that both PCCs and police forces all have websites 
(POLICE.UK, 2017), publishing the documents online would have the greatest utility. 
The websites of all 43 PCCs were searched during autumn 2016 to locate the local 
Community Remedy document (see Table 1). At this point, the document was 
published online by 32 out of 43 PCCs.  By July 2018 the number of published 
Community Remedy documents had risen to 37 with only Humberside providing no 
indication of future plans for the Community Remedy. Dorset and Bedfordshire had 
incorporated the Community Remedy into reviews of out of court disposals whilst 
Thames Valley had re-designed all of their provision for victims of crime and 
incorporated it within a new service called Victims First6. Both Gloucestershire and 
Hertfordshire had followed a similar path with the development of Restorative and 
Victim Care hubs respectively. The final missing document was from the London 
Mayor's Office for Police and Crime (MOPAC). The MOPAC Community Remedy 
document had been published by the time of our second review of webpages in July 
2017 but it had gone missing again by July 2018 amidst disagreements about the policy 
implementation process. Overall, these findings are illustrative of a disjointed policy 
implementation process across the country, which reflects both the early stages of the 
                                            
6
 Victims First was launched in April 2017. Although the Community Remedy is not visible within this 
work the website states that this new service incorporates all of Thames Valley's restorative justice 
services and is delivered by the Thames Valley partnership. It is notable that Victims First identifies itself 
as a victim-initiated, rather than police or criminal justice led, project and this may explain the absence 
of visibility given to the Community Remedy. 
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PCC-police force relationship and the different mechanisms that police organisations 
have established to administer the Community Remedy. 
 
A content analysis of the 37 available Community Remedy documents was undertaken 
to provide an insight into the number and types of actions (reparative, punitive or 
rehabilitative) selected for inclusion (see Table 1)7. There was a large amount of 
variance between the contents of the local documents. For example, the number of 
actions they contained ranged between 3 and 13. This demonstrates that the amount 
of choice victims have is markedly different, depending on where they live. The 
underlying rationale for each of the actions contained in the document was also 
considered. Reparative actions were the most commonly listed, the mean average for 
each document was 4.1 (with a range of 1-7). Most of these actions were taken 
directly, or adapted, from Home Office guidance (2014) and were standardised across 
the sample. For example: paying for the costs of damage caused, mediation, and 
restorative justice activities. This aligns with the policy rhetoric and restorative policing 
theme. Punitive and rehabilitative actions were much less common, with mean 
averages of 1.2 and 1.1, and ranges of 0-3 and 0-4 actions respectively. Common 
                                            
7
 This includes the documents from City of London and Metropolitan Police which have since been 
withdrawn. 
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punitive actions were Acceptable Behaviour Contracts8, Parenting Contracts and 
actions that trigger tenancy/landlord involvement. Rehabilitative actions generally 
took two forms. First, referrals to treatment agencies, such as drugs, alcohol or anger 
management services. Second, engagement with structured activities, for example 
educational courses, funded by the PCC. Some forces also included actions that we 
categorised as ‘other’ during our analyses because they did not align with the original 
classifications. Only 8 forces included these types of actions and they reflected two 
options. Firstly, 6 forces included a ‘bespoke’ option that allows any action to be taken 
so long as it is agreed by both parties. Two of these forces stated that this must be 
agreed by the officer’s line manager. Whilst adding flexibility to the process, this also 
opens the potential for discrimination based on the high level of individual discretion 
available. Finally, 2 forces included a ‘word of warning from a police officer or PCSO’ as 
an action.  
 
We also examined how similar the published Community Remedy documents were to 
the Home Office guidance document, which contains a list of 7 example actions. We 
were interested to see how innovative PCCs had been in creating responsive actions to 
                                            
8
 Acceptable Behaviour Contracts are a voluntary written agreement between an ASB perpetrator and a 
responsible authority (e.g. police). They are commonly used as an early intervention to prevent low-
level ASB. 
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meet the needs and demands of their local communities, and how much the public’s 
views had been taken into account (based on the consultation process). Many of the 
documents demonstrated responsiveness to local issues, for example, some 
documents included reference to specific crimes such as graffiti, or specific locally-
based structured activities such as litter picking. However, 100% of the actions on 6 
documents were taken directly from the Home Office guidance. In one of these force 
areas, the PCC had not demonstrated any evidence of undertaking a public 
consultation. Nevertheless, 5 of the documents were from PCCs that did not 
demonstrate engagement with the community, which provokes questions about the 
utility and value of the consultation process. 
 
Usage 
All police forces in England and Wales were sent a Freedom of Information (FOI) 
request, which asked whether: the force had used the Community Remedy, the 
number of times it had been used between 20 October 2014 and 20 April 2017 (2.5 
year period), with follow-up questions about the number of times different types of 
actions had been used (reparative, punitive or rehabilitative) if the data was available 
under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act (2000). We selected a recording 
period of 2.5 years since implementation to get a standardised measure of usage since 
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adoption. We received responses from 31 forces, with the information refused on 9 
occasions9 (see Table 1). Where information was provided, the data we received was 
eclectic. Of the 22 forces that provided details, 2 stated that no information was held. 
The remaining 20 forces provided an extremely diverse array of data, which did not 
necessarily answer the questions posed (despite the questions being phrased to 
request very specific information).  
 
In terms of usage, the Community Remedy has been used by 13 forces, 4 did not give a 
specific answer (e.g. ‘X police force has considered the use of the Community 
Remedy’), with the remaining 3 forces saying they had used it, but referring to 
‘community resolutions’ instead. This is the umbrella term for out of court solutions 
whereby police officers divert what they perceive to be low-level incidents out of the 
formal criminal justice system. The definition of a 'low-level' incident is decided locally 
and includes crime as well as ASB. When reporting the number of times the 
Community Remedy had been used, 15 forces provided numerical usage data. In the 
case of 10 forces, this broadly related to ‘community resolutions’ (despite some of 
these saying yes to the first question about the Community Remedy specifically), with 
                                            
9
 The information was refused on the grounds that a public authority is not obliged to provide the 
information if the authority estimates that the cost of the retrieval of the information requested would 
be in excess of £450 (equivalent to 18 hours work). 
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a further 2 providing the numbers of ‘disposals’. One force provided a combined total 
of community resolutions, adult and youth conditional cautions, alternate offence 
youth conditional cautions and youth restorative disposals, which highlights the varied 
way this data is collected. 9 forces provided no usage figures. This was generally 
because the data was not specifically recorded and extraction would exceed the limits 
of a FOI request. Only 3 forces provided data that specifically referred to Community 
Remedy usage.  The figures quoted ranged from 205 to 16,264. This further reflects 
the wide variation in all aspects of the implementation of the Community Remedy. 
 
Of the 12 forces that did not respond to the FOI request, two had also failed to publish 
a copy of the Community Remedy document on either theirs or the PCC’s website. 
Public authorities have a legal duty to respond to FOI requests within 20 working days. 
When a response is not provided, researchers can lodge an appeal with the 
Information Commissioner to obtain the information. Based on the data already 
received, we decided not to pursue the non-responding forces through the 
Information Commissioner because we concluded that the quality of the data received 
from the other forces did not warrant the extra time and resources required to make 
the appeals (Savage and Hyde, 2014). 
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Through the completed FOI requests, we found two force areas that did not publish 
their documents did confirm that they were using the Community Remedy, which 
further reinforces the haphazard nature of the implementation and communication of 
this policy. Thames Valley refer to a figure of 6836 restorative disposals which reflect 
their local Victims First commissioning strategy whereas Hertfordshire, who 
commissioned a Victim Care Centre, refer to 856 community resolutions. Having read 
the detailed FOI responses alongside assessing the raw data, it appears that many 
forces do not specifically record Community Remedy usage, and many have conflated 
the terms Community Remedy and community resolution. It is clear that many regions 
have referred to a ‘community remedy’ in a colloquial way, rather than the ASB policy 
sense (despite the FOI being very explicit about the policy and terminology). No forces 
answered the final three supplementary questions on the FOI request about the types 
of Community Remedy action selected, which supports the assumption that this type 
of data is not collected.  
 
The three forces that provided detailed statistics about their use of the Community 
Remedy had previously established restorative justice hubs through which to co-
ordinate practice. The two highest users, Derbyshire and Essex, clearly articulated the 
role of the Community Remedy and had trained police officers to use it (Derbyshire 
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Police and Crime Commissioner, 2018; Essex OPCC Annual report, 2016). Furthermore, 
Essex implemented the policy alongside a public relations strategy with the specific 
aim of enhancing awareness of restorative justice (Essex OPCC Annual report, 2016: 9) 
which may explain their scale of use. The third force, South Yorkshire, has a clearly 
articulated framework for use but had not yet trained its front line officers to use the 
Community Remedy. With South Yorkshire, the 2014 Act was introduced at the same 
time that the force was reducing its neighbourhood policing capacity and this led to 
less inter-agency co-operation and little discussion about how to implement new 
powers such as the Community Remedy (Pers Comm, 2017). Take-up in these three 
regions seems to embrace both the reparative element of the Community Remedy and 
the critiques of the enforcement focus of ASB which hampered its development during 
and after the New Labour years (Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011). In Derbyshire and South 
Yorkshire, a third-sector stakeholder plays a key role in delivering restorative services, 
whilst in Essex an inter-agency structure underpins a range of restorative options. 
These structures establish a clear restorative voice in the Community Remedy policy 
development, articulation and implementation process. 
 
Examining Table 1 as a whole dataset demonstrates that PCCs and forces have taken 
diverse and divergent approaches to the Community Remedy. The findings highlight a 
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continuum that runs from policy implementation failure in London to the integration 
of the Community Remedy into regional strategies that reflect local thinking about 
ASB, out of court disposals and restorative practices. Patchy implementation could be 
a consequence of a lack of top-down scrutiny which was uncovered by a response to a 
separate FOI request made to the Home Office in a different research project about 
the monitoring of public spaces protections orders (see Heap and Dickinson, 2018). 
The response stated: 'we do not monitor the use of anti-social behaviour powers 
introduced by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014' (Home Office, 
2016, pers. comm.), demonstrating that there is no national oversight of any of the 
new powers, including the Community Remedy. 
 
Discussion 
The uneven implementation processes that are evidenced above can be explained 
through an analytical framework which draws upon the, as yet, only partially realised 
aspirations of democratic localism and the role of PCCs and their regional teams as 
increasingly powerful policy entrepreneurs. The content analysis provides some 
indication of how local networks of governance have interpreted the purpose of the 
Community Remedy. The findings indicate that while some regions have implemented 
and utilised the Community Remedy, others have either not met their statutory duties 
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or have chosen not to add the Community Remedy to their local toolbox of community 
resolutions.  Interpretation of the policy has taken place within a context where 
restorative responses have superseded enforcement-led responses and thus reflect 
the view of the local networks that have guided policy implementation. Reparative 
actions are the most commonly listed on the documents and this provides some 
indication that the Community Remedy has been interpreted through a restorative 
lens. Extensive use of reparative elements indicates that the Community Remedy has 
been implemented as an adaptation of previous ASB measures with an enhanced 
victim-orientation that, on occasion, has been subsumed into wider restorative 
approaches. 
 
While the police act as gatekeepers to both the formal criminal justice system and the 
Community Remedy they are also increasingly involved in supporting diversion to 
other agencies as part of their demand reduction agenda and, in some regions, are 
proactively responsibilising other statutory and third sector agencies to take a more 
prominent role in victim-oriented community interventions (see, for example, Beacon, 
2019). Yet, although the Community Remedy policy is victim-oriented in appearance it 
is ultimately system-oriented in delivery (Davies, 2007) and elsewhere in the data 
there is evidence of limited buy-in at the local level to a victim focus, public 
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consultation and the principles of democratic localism that local officials and 
institutions are supposed to exemplify.  
 
The diversity of responses and unevenness in the implementation of the Community 
Remedy policy was further illustrated by the range of 'community resolutions' that 
were referred to by ten forces. It was clear in these instances that the Community 
Remedy had been subsumed into a range of options for community-based resolutions. 
Similar confusion was found in Shapland et al.’s (2017) review of restorative policing in 
Humberside, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire where the introduction of new 
restorative measures were often interpreted as new tools to resolve 'police' problems 
through diversion and associated demand reduction upon the Police Service. The 
Community Remedy presents opportunities for officers to act as community leaders 
and connectors to other statutory or third-sector services, yet there remains much 
diversity at the local level in terms of which types of services are available.  
  
The data presented in this article indicates some regions have not engaged with the 
Community Remedy whilst others have begun to articulate a local policing philosophy, 
in partnership with the public, which informs its use. The presentation of data by 
forces as 'community resolutions' offers an important insight into policy translation at 
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the local level and an understanding of the Community Remedy as one of a plethora of 
community level out of court options, which seek to decrease demand upon police 
organisations and offer the potential to mobilise other elements of civil society in 
policing.  
 
The failure to engage with communities in some regions, coupled with the co-option of 
the Community Remedy power as a demand reduction tool is not surprising. There is 
evidence of both tokenistic and disengaged responses to the Community Remedy 
emerging out of this study, as well as highly engaged and consultative policy 
development. As Turner (2014: 17) suggests 'there is very little, if any, emphasis placed 
on the need for PCCs to scrutinise whether police forces are fair and equal in their 
distribution of coercion and protection, and in the manner in which they wield their 
considerable power'. Inadequate democratic engagement at the local level is likely to 
lead to insufficient scrutiny of policy implementation and poor accountability 
mechanisms. The success of the Community Remedy thus far has been led by local 
level entrepreneurs operating out of established structures with a clear aim to connect 
communities, police agencies and third sector partners to solve local problems in a 
systematic manner.  Without meaningful democratic engagement at the local level the 
Community Remedy is likely to wither and wane as there is a clear challenge to 
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building a victim-orientation in offender-oriented agencies that are infused with 
punitive ideologies.  
 
Further analysis of the demographics of Community Remedy consultation, 
implementation and use, as well as impact and effectiveness, is required to elicit a full 
understanding of how the tool is understood at the community level. Local 
entrepreneurs engage the public with policy but this street-level engagement requires 
support structures and resources to deliver upon its discourse and promises. At the 
same time, this approach simultaneously reduces the scope of state involvement and 
absolves it of responsibility should the process not work properly (Duggan and Heap, 
2014). An absence of initial consultation and partnership engagement is likely to lead 
to either poor or non-existent implementation, as well as a lack of public 
accountability. Local discrepancies in use are fine if the actions reflect local capabilities 
(e.g. the availability of restorative or rehabilitative programmes) and there is some 
provision available. Yet, the Ministry of Justice funds allocated to PCCs for the 
commissioning of victims services do not include victims of ASB. If this policy is 
implemented with an absence of engagement and/or provision then the Community 
Remedy will soon be characterised as providing a postcode lottery, similar to the 
Community Trigger (Heap, 2016). 
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As well as the structural, developmental and implementation concerns highlighted 
here, further investigation is required to understand how ASB victims experience the 
Community Remedy.  The way ASB manifests in communities may not necessarily be 
suitable to a restorative approach. ASB is often characterised by persistent nuisance 
behaviour, which can escalate in severity where victims and offenders reside in close 
proximity. The perpetrator may have been caught committing their first offence, but 
their individual ASB might be experienced by the victim as part of a campaign of 
targeted harassment. As such, it is questionable whether the Community Remedy is 
the best tool to i) initially stop the behaviour in question, and ii) prevent it from 
reoccurring in the long term. Victims must give their consent to use the Community 
Remedy; however they may feel that they have no option but to agree. Restorative 
approaches implicitly require some recognition of harm, and even remorse, yet 
neighbourhood disputes tend to be underpinned by more retributive feelings. 
Consequently, the Community Remedy may be unsuitable due to the fear of reprisals. 
Fear was found to be a major barrier to reporting ASB by Heap (2010), with the 
prospect of the Community Remedy potentially fuelling additional under-reporting if a 
victim feels they may be putting themselves at further or increased risk of victimisation 
(which also affects victims' potential to access the Community Trigger). Reductively, 
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the policy rhetoric champions that 'what matters is that the punishment will be chosen 
by the victim’ (May, 2012) yet this oversimplifies the proximity and reporting tensions 
associated with ASB.   
   
Conclusion 
It is certainly too early to make sense of the role of the Community Remedy within the 
ever-evolving complex of community and criminal justice interventions, but it is 
possible to offer some initial commentary on its first phase of usage. As expected, the 
implementation and use of the Community Remedy is varied and linked to the role of 
key influencers in local networks of governance who direct policy and practice. Thus, 
any commentary on ‘postcode lotteries’ or the strengthening of democratic localism 
depends largely upon individual ideological perspectives and the extent of political 
engagement in each local context. The Community Remedy should thus be understood 
as a component of an ever-morphing structure of regulatory governance that 
manifests itself through local structures of power and philosophies of social, 
community and criminal justice. As the Community Remedy has been police-led its 
policy development needs to be understood using a framework that extends beyond 
the traditional ASB industry and recognises that this might not be joining up with other 
sanctions already being undertaken by registered providers of social housing relating 
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to the perpetrator's tenancy. It is therefore useful to view the development of the 
Community Remedy alongside the concomitant evolution of restorative policing and 
the proliferation of out of court disposals available to police organisations.  
 
Future research should focus more closely upon the roles of Community Remedy 
stakeholders. The findings of this study highlight significant variations in usage and 
patterns of engagement and further analysis is needed of the actions, behaviours and 
activities of the local networks of governance where important decisions are made. 
The paper thus illustrates the growth in importance of processes of devolution that 
seek to both enhance democratic engagement at the local level and responsibilise a 
range of agencies in the policing of ASB and other forms of low level disorder. It is this 
potential to strengthen democratic localism and mobilise civic enterprises through a 
mixture of formal and informal modes of policing that will lead to the successful 
implementation and use of the Community Remedy.  
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